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A. Introduction
The lack of government response to the current
wave of tax-motivated corporate expatriations is
disheartening.1 Senate Finance Committee Chair
Ron Wyden, D-Ore., Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., and
Rep. Sander Levin, D-Mich., are to be praised for
their leadership on this issue; however, in the
current political environment there is little reason to
believe that a statutory solution will be enacted.
One looks in vain at the tax press each day to see
what action is being taken, not just talked about,
and as of this writing, nothing has been done. This
article demonstrates that it is not necessary for
Treasury to wait for Congress to act on corporate
expatriations.
This article describes the principal tax benefits
companies seek from expatriating and outlines
regulatory actions that can be taken without legis-
lative action to materially reduce the tax incentive
to expatriate. These proposals for regulations are
supported by existing statutory authority. They
would be good policy and consistent with, or easily
integrated with, publicly proposed tax reform pro-
posals.
One of the Treasury secretary’s most important
responsibilities is the health of the tax system under
the laws adopted by Congress. Congress has given
Treasury broad and in some cases sweeping author-
ity to adopt regulations, including specific grants of
authority that bear on issues at the heart of corpo-
rate inversions. The proposals here are just one set
of alternatives available to Treasury that could
powerfully affect the incentive to expatriate. Others
no doubt have improvements to these or other
alternatives to propose; however, when a material
portion of the U.S. corporate tax base is at risk,
doing nothing borders on the irresponsible.
B. Tax Benefits of Corporate Expatriation
Corporate expatriations afford two principal tax
benefits. First, the new foreign parent (or one of its
non-U.S. subsidiaries) can strip the U.S. tax base (for
example,throughdistributionofanotefromtheU.S.
group)toachievecashandbooktaxsavings.Second,
the untaxed foreign earnings of former U.S. parent
company’s controlled foreign corporations can be
redeployed for use by non-CFC affiliates, including
for group debt reduction and stock buy-backs by the
new foreign parent, without causing a taxable
deemed repatriation to the former U.S. parent.2
1President Obama has spoken out against corporate expa-
triations. Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew has written letters to
Senate Finance Committee Chair Ron Wyden, D-Ore., House
Ways and Means Committee Chair Dave Camp, R-Mich., and
ranking members of the congressional taxwriting committees
urging immediate legislative action to stop corporate expatria-
tions and calling for a ‘‘new sense of economic patriotism.’’
Wyden has also written a Wall Street Journal op-ed stating that
any legislation will have a May 8, 2014, effective date (‘‘We Must
Stop Driving Businesses Out of the Country,’’ The Wall Street
Journal, May 9, 2014). Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., and others have
introduced legislation that would make expatriations more
difficult to achieve (S. 2360; H.R. 4679). The Obama administra-
tion has included a similar proposal in its budget. In a reply to
Lew, Finance Committee ranking minority member Orrin G.
Hatch, R-Utah, has indicated his willingness to work on a
short-term response short of tax reform, while objecting to what
he believes are the political overtones of Lew’s call for economic
patriotism.
2In some situations, it may be possible to deny tax benefits
from these strategies under existing tax doctrines. I do not
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.The financial statement and cash tax savings that
derive from introducing substantial intercompany
debt into the U.S. group to strip the U.S. tax base
into a jurisdiction where the interest income will be
subject to much lower rates of tax are a major driver
of corporate expatriations. In their report on the
rumored Walgreens inversion, Barclays Bank PLC
research analysts estimated that Walgreens could
offset just under half of its earnings before interest,
taxes, depreciation, and amortization with inter-
company interest and not run afoul of the interest
deduction limitation rules of section 163(j).3 They
estimated that the tax savings (for one year) would
be $783 million. It is not surprising that Wall Street
investment bankers are pushing these deals and
that deal activity is reaching a frenzied level.
Companies involved in expatriations from the
early 2000s have filed tax court petitions to protect
the fruits of their huge leveraging of U.S. opera-
tions.4 There is reason to suspect that the IRS will
have mixed success combating this stripping of the
U.S. tax base. In 2012 the IRS lost its debt-equity case
against ScottishPower Ltd.’s hybrid instrument.5 In
a 2009 Tax Court case, the IRS conceded 100 percent
of a huge GlaxoSmithKline PLC deficiency relating
to a $13.5 billion intercompany obligation to Glaxo-
SmithKline Investments (Switzerland) GmbH.6
A second major incentive to invert is to lend
untaxed offshore controlled foreign subsidiary
(CFC) earnings to non-U.S. affiliates (that are not
direct or indirect subsidiaries of the former U.S.
parent), to repay debt (including debt incurred to
make the acquisition), to fund distributions in re-
spect of stock and, indirectly, to make up for
funding of the U.S. group.7 To achieve these tax
savings, it is necessary to avoid constructive divi-
dend foot faults,8 but the case law is quite favorable
for taxpayers. With diligence and planning, the tax
risks are manageable. The pressure to be able to use
untaxed foreign subsidiary earnings held in cash
offshore is evidenced by the lengths that Hewlett-
Packard Co. went to in trying to circumvent the
investment in U.S. property rules of section 956.9
Cross-border, related-party debt equity issues
need to be addressed in tax reform and, indeed,
have been targeted by Camp’s tax reform plan and
an administration budget proposal. There is clear
regulatory authority, however, to address excessive
related-party debt under current law. A second
major object of a corporate expatriation is to obtain
access to offshore cash, earned while the foreign
subsidiary was subject to U.S. taxing jurisdiction,
without U.S. taxation of the earnings that gave rise
to the cash. Clever tax planners use corporate
expatriations to insert a foreign parent and use
loans to try to hopscotch over or out of the U.S. tax
base.10 Treasury has both conventional regulatory
authority and extraordinary multiparty financial
regulatory authority to protect against this latest
form of avoidance of these rules.
C. Reduce Expatriation Tax Incentives
1. Related-party debt-to-equity limitation. The ex-
plicit language of section 385 gives the Treasury
secretary direct and powerful regulatory authority
to reclassify debt as equity and thereby transform a
deductible interest payment into a nondeductible
discuss this possibility simply because those risks have not been
sufficient to deter corporate expatriations.
3Meredith Adler and Eric Percher, ‘‘Walgreen Co., Investors
in the Driver’s Seat; Upgrading to Overweight,’’ Barclays Re-
search, at 36 (June 18, 2014) (‘‘Put another way, as much as 50
percent or more of Walgreen’s annual adjusted taxable income
(which would otherwise be paid as a taxable dividend to the
[new foreign] parent) may be effectively exempted from U.S.
income taxes by recapitalizing Walgreens with intercompany
debt’’). See also Americans for Tax Fairness and Change to Win,
‘‘Offshoring America’s Drugstore, Walgreens May Move Its
Corporate Address to a Tax Haven to Avoid Paying Billions in
U.S. Taxes’’ (June 2014), available at http://walgreenstrategy
watch.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/OffshoringAmericas
Drugstore.pdf.
4All of the former Tyco International Ltd. companies have
filed petitions contesting the disallowance of interest expense on
intercompany debt. See Matthew Madara, ‘‘Tyco Petition Seeks
to Avoid Billions in Adjustments,’’ Tax Notes, Sept. 2, 2013, p.
976.
5NA General Partnership v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-
172.
6GlaxoSmithKline-Kline Holdings (America) Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, Nos. 18940-08, 18941-08 (T.C. Nov. 18, 2009). See Jasper L.
Cummings, Jr., ‘‘Income Stripping by Interest Deductions,’’ Tax
Notes, Dec. 2, 2013, p. 971 (‘‘The IRS knows that the debt/equity
argument is messy and hard to win against a taxpayer that has
tried to plan around it. For example, in 2009 the IRS conceded
100 percent of a huge deficiency assessment contested by
GlaxoSmithKline Holdings in the Tax Court. The debt and the
interest paid on it to the foreign parent were pretty obviously a
sort of income stripping, which the IRS effectively blessed’’).
7Credit Suisse European Pharma Team, Shire + AbbVie 1
(June 24, 2014) (‘‘Reducing the US tax penalty on repatriation of
ABBV’s overseas earnings is the key driver of the transaction, in
our view’’).
8Under the tax law, generally, a corporate action gives rise to
a constructive dividend if it confers a specific economic benefit
on its shareholder. See generally Bittker and Eustice, Federal
Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders, para. 8.06.
9See Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Hearing on Off-
shore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code, Exhibit 1, ‘‘Memo-
randum From Chairman Carl Levin and Senator Tom Coburn to
Subcommittee Members, Offshore Profit Shifting and the Inter-
nal Revenue Code,’’ 24-27 (Sept. 20, 2012), available at http://
www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearing
s/offshore-profit-shifting-and-the-us-tax-code.
10Edward D. Kleinbard, ‘‘Tax Inversions Must Be Stopped
Now,’’ The Wall Street Journal, July 21, 2014.
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.dividend.11 Under section 385, it is possible and
appropriate to identify cases in which the use of
related-party debt exceeds thresholds that should
be acceptable in a particular case.
A variation of Camp’s proposal to limit excess
domestic indebtedness for U.S. members of a
worldwide affiliated group, and the administra-
tion’s budget proposal to limit earnings stripping,
could be implemented as a regulation under section
385. The target is excessive related-party debt. This
debt routinely is subordinated to external debt,
directly or structurally. Consequently, two or more
of the factors in section 385(b) will be relevant to the
analysis of excess domestic indebtedness.12 One
proposal would be described roughly as follows:
AU.S. corporation that is an expatriated entity
would classify as equity any debt issued to a
foreign member of the expanded affiliated
group that is not a CFC to the extent that, at
the close of the year of issuance, the U.S.
corporation otherwise would have excess U.S.
indebtedness. Excess U.S. indebtedness would
be determined according to the lesser of the
following two amounts:
• The amount by which the total indebted-
ness of the U.S. members of the expanded
affiliated group exceeds 110 percent of the
debt those members would hold if their
aggregate debt-to-equity ratio were equal
to the ratio of debt-to-equity of the expa-
triated entity’s affiliated group, averaged
for the three years prior to the expatria-
tion date and determined without regard
to intragroup debt.
• The amount of U.S. corporation debt with
respect to which net interest expense of
the U.S. corporation would exceed 25
percent of the U.S. corporation’s average
adjusted taxable income for the three
years prior to the year of debt issuance.13
If this provision were adopted, Barclays’ pro-
jected benefit of the Walgreens intercompany debt
would be reduced by hundreds of millions of
dollars. That would change the calculus of a deci-
sion to expatriate, even if it would not change the
decision in every case.
Section 385 is not normally thought of as an
antiabuse provision (indeed, it has hardly been
thought of at all since it was amended in 1992) and
this proposal is to apply it to only a subset of related
party cases — those involving expatriated entities.
The plain language of the statutory provision, how-
ever, authorizes its application to a particular fac-
tual situation and therefore supports a regulation
addressing expatriated entities, which is compa-
rable to a group found by Treasury in 2007 to
engage in earnings stripping against which section
163(j) was ineffective.14
Why limit this proposal to an expatriated entity?
Why not apply it to every foreign parent group?
Also, why not extend the use of section 385 to pick
up base erosion cases in which interest income on
11Section 385(a) provides in relevant part:
Section 385. Treatment of certain interests in corporations
as stock or indebtedness
(a) Authority to prescribe regulations. — The Secretary is
authorized to prescribe such regulations as may be nec-
essary or appropriate to determine whether an interest in
a corporation is to be treated for purposes of this title as
stock or indebtedness (or as in part stock and in part
indebtedness).
(b) Factors. — The regulations prescribed under this
section shall set forth factors which are to be taken into
account in determining with respect to a particular factual
situation whether a debtor-creditor relationship exists or a
corporation-shareholder relationship exists. The factors
so set forth in the regulations may include among other
factors:
...
(2) whether there is subordination to or preference over
any indebtedness of the corporation,
(3) the ratio of debt to equity of the corporation,
...,a n d
(5) the relationship between holdings of stock in the
corporation and holdings of the interest in question.
[Emphasis added.]
12As a matter of textual statutory interpretation, none of the
factors listed in section 385 need to be invoked. The only
requirement of the statute is that Treasury set forth factors to
take into account a particular factual situation.
13Some definitions and rules of application drawn from the
various proposals flesh out this approach:
• If the U.S. corporation is a member of a group filing a
U.S. consolidated return, the rules would treat the
consolidated return participants as a single taxpayer.
• An expanded affiliated group is one or more chains of
corporations, connected through stock ownership with
a common parent that would qualify as an affiliated
group under section 1504, except the ownership thresh-
old of section 1504(a)(2) is applied using 50 percent
rather than 80 percent and the restriction on inclusion
of a foreign corporation under section 1504(b)(3) is
disregarded for purposes of identifying the worldwide
affiliated group. This is the definition in section
7874(c)(1).
• Net interest expense is the amount of interest paid or
accrued in the tax year in excess of the amount of
interest includable in gross income for the same tax
year, as defined in section 163(j)(6)(B).
• Adjusted taxable income is taxable income increased by
deductible losses, interest, depreciation and amortiza-
tion, qualified production expenses, and so on as
defined in section 163(j)(6)(A).
The regulations would provide antiavoidance rules and rules
for the treatment of partnership indebtedness, allocation of
partnership debt, interest, or distributive shares.
14Treasury, ‘‘Earnings Stripping, Transfer Pricing, and U.S.
Income Tax Treaties,’’ at 21-31 (Nov. 2007).
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.indebtedness is not taxed in the hands of the
holder? Both of these ideas, and more, could be
adapted to section 385. There is no doubt that a
more comprehensive approach to protecting the
U.S. tax base would be preferred as a pure policy
matter. Since this proposal is intended to be a
stopgap measure until the adoption of tax reform,
and since rapid adoption is critical, I would opt to
keep the fix limited to expatriation cases.15
2. Protecting deferred U.S. taxation of CFC earn-
ings. The U.S. tax rules for deferring U.S. tax on
active earnings of CFC subsidiaries generally are
conditioned on not using the assets of the foreign
subsidiary, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of
the U.S. parent.16 Thus, U.S. rules generally cause
foreign subsidiary loans to the U.S. parent, use of
foreign subsidiary assets to secure U.S. parent debt,
or even foreign subsidiary guarantees of U.S. parent
debt as deemed distributions of the untaxed earn-
ings. The policy behind these rules is that CFC
earnings that have not been subject to U.S. taxation
should not be allowed to be used on a pretax basis
for the benefit of the U.S. parent or its U.S. affiliates.
The insertion of a foreign holding company in a
corporate expatriation should not allow the use of
untaxed foreign subsidiary earnings outside the
scope of current or future U.S. corporate tax and
circumvent the U.S. tax system. This tax avoidance
purportedly is accomplished by lending CFC earn-
ings that have not been taxed by the United States
to the new foreign parent or non-CFC members of
the group or, over time, by decontrolling the CFC so
as to take the CFC outside the scope of the U.S. rules
for taxing these earnings.
In a corporate expatriation transaction, share-
holders of the former U.S. parent company transfer
their shares in exchange for shares of the new
foreign parent company.17 For the transaction to be
covered by section 7874, the former shareholders of
the expatriated U.S. parent must own between 60
and 80 percent of the new foreign parent.18 The CFC
subsidiaries of the expatriated U.S. company con-
tinue to be subject to the deferred U.S. tax rules (as
long as they are not decontrolled). Regulatory au-
thority could be used to ensure that the inversion is
not used to gain access to earnings that should be
subject to deferred U.S. tax in companies that are
not owned by the expatriated U.S. companies. This
would protect the deferred U.S. taxation of untaxed
CFC earnings and the integrity of section 956 rules
for investments in U.S. property.
Multiple sources of regulatory authority may
apply, individually or in combination, to support
application of section 956 to corporate expatriation
tax avoidance schemes. These provisions include
sections 956(e), 7701(l), and 7874(g),19 as well as
section 7805.20
In the corporate expatriation context, the surro-
gate foreign corporation is inserted between the
former shareholders and former U.S. parent (as part
of an acquisition of a foreign target). If (i) a subsid-
iary of the former U.S. parent makes a loan to the
new foreign parent (or a member of its group), and
(ii) the new foreign parent (or a member of its
group) makes a loan to the former U.S. parent (or
any expatriated U.S. entity), the CFC should be
considered to be financing, directly or indirectly, the
loan to the U.S. person. In this intercompany loan
case, the CFC loan should be considered made to an
15As a practical matter of political economy, a broader
proposal would attract enormous lobbying by foreign parent
groups and their trade associations (such as the Organization
for International Investment). There will be enough time con-
sumed by lobbyists for representatives of U.S. multinationals.
16See generally section 956 and regulations thereunder.
17If there is sufficient continuing ownership, the new foreign
parent is classified as a ‘‘surrogate foreign corporation.’’ The
former U.S. parent and some related U.S. persons are the
expatriated entities.
18In other words, as part of the expatriation transaction, the
former U.S. parent acquires a foreign company whose equity
value is at least 20 percent of the combined company. This is a
meaningful transaction. It nonetheless is an example of what
Joel Slemrod dubs the ‘‘avoidance-facilitating effect’’ of real
decisions. See Joel Slemrod, ‘‘Location, (Real) Location, (Tax)
Location: An Essay on Mobility’s Place in Optimal Taxation,’’ 63
Nat. Tax J. 843, 856 (2010). The acquisition of a real asset should
not immunize the tax avoidance part of the transaction, which is
the use of a new holding company to avoid the use of CFC
earnings for the benefit of the former U.S. parent (or its
shareholders).
19Section 956(e) provides:
(e) Regulations.—The Secretary shall prescribe such regu-
lations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of
this section, including regulations to prevent the avoid-
ance of the provisions of this section through reorganiza-
tions or otherwise. [Emphasis added.]
Section 7701(l) provides:
(l) Regulations relating to conduit arrangements.—The
Secretary may prescribe regulations recharacterizing any
multiple-party financing transaction as a transaction di-
rectly among any 2 or more of such parties where the
Secretary determines that such recharacterization is appro-
priate to prevent avoidance of any tax imposed by this title.
[Emphasis added.]
Section 7874(g) provides in part:
(g) Regulations.—The Secretary shall provide such regu-
lations as are necessary to carry out this section, including
regulations providing for such adjustments to the applica-
tion of this section as are necessary to prevent the avoidance of
the purposes of this section. [Emphasis added.]
20The regulatory approaches described in this note do not
exhaust the regulatory authority alternatives. Other provisions
that could be looked to include sections 7701(o) and 269.
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.expatriated U.S. entity and be analyzed as an in-
vestment in U.S. property. This would be a fairly
straightforward use of section 7701(l) regulatory
authority.
What if a CFC subsidiary lends funds to the new
foreign parent and the new foreign parent buys
back stock from its shareholders? The loan to the
new foreign parent is hopscotching over the former
U.S. parent and not returning to the U.S. parent.
However, the buyback has the same effect as if the
CFC made the loan to the U.S. parent to buy back its
stock (before the acquisition) and then distributed
the repayment obligation to the new foreign parent
(after the acquisition). Alternatively, it has the same
effect as a loan to the new foreign parent to acquire
shares in the former U.S. parent.21 In either case, the
asset is in the hands of the new foreign parent and
not the U.S. parent, but the untaxed earnings are
indirectly used to acquire stock in the former U.S.
parent. Although not as clear as in the intercom-
pany loan case, the combined authority of sections
956(e) and 7701(l) could support treating the loan as
an investment in U.S. property.
The following proposal, again described in rough
preliminary language, could be adopted under the
regulatory authority of the sections described
above:
If the assets of a CFC subsidiary of the former
U.S. parent (an expatriated entity) are used to
make a loan to the new foreign parent (i.e., the
surrogate foreign corporation) or a non-CFC
subsidiary thereof, and either (i) the surrogate
foreign corporation makes a distribution to its
shareholders in redemption of its stock (within
a time period to be specified), or (ii) within the
applicable period (defined in section
7874(d)(1) as 10 years from the corporate ex-
patriation) the surrogate foreign parent or a
member of its expanded affiliated group that is
not a CFC holds an obligation of the former
U.S. parent or a member of its affiliated group,
the loan by the CFC should be treated as U.S.
property under section 956(c).
This approach would use the section 956 rules to
operate in respect of untaxed CFC earnings and
profits hopscotched around the U.S. parent to non-
CFC foreign affiliates when loans are made to (U.S.)
expatriated entities or stock is bought back from
shareholders.
D. Evaluation of Regulatory Action
1. Overview. The obvious advantage of taking
regulatory action is the ability to act quickly. That is
especially important because more and more com-
panies are planning or seeking transactions that
take advantage of apparent statutory loopholes.
One banker has told me he expects the volume of
deals to be announced in September of this year to
be double the volume of deals announced in June
and July. The alternatives suggested above do not
prohibit corporate expatriation transactions, but
they would change the tax calculus of having a
non-U.S. parent in relation to use of earnings-
stripping intercompany debt and CFC earnings.22
The exercise of regulatory authority changes the
default position. Instead of waiting for Congress to
act and relying on the market to deal with the risk
of losing the corporate tax base in the meantime (in
hopes there would be an inadequate supply of
foreign targets23 or the price or risk of acquiring
foreign targets goes too high), adopting regulations
first would reduce the risk to the U.S. corporate tax
base while Congress considers how to address the
problem in legislation as part of tax reform or
otherwise.
Asecond advantage is that regulatory action also
may reduce tax benefits to companies that have
already undertaken tax-motivated expatriations. It
is appropriate to limit, as much as is possible under
the rules of section 7805, the fruits of abusive
tax-motivated transactions.
2. Revenue and politics. The Stop Corporate Inver-
sions Act of 2014 is estimated by the Joint Commit-
tee on Taxation to raise $19.5 billion over 10 years.A
regulatory change is not treated as raising revenue
until revenue is received (that is, loss of revenue
does not occur). It does not have the benefit of
making available a revenue offset for Congress to
21If the loan is used to buy back shares of the foreign parent
that were issued to shareholders of the foreign target, there
could be a separate question of how those shares should be
treated for purposes of section 7874, but that is beyond the scope
of this discussion.
22As discussed above, non-U.S.-parent groups have inappro-
priate advantages in reducing the U.S. corporate tax base. These
proposals should apply to foreign parent groups as well as to
expatriation cases; however, for reasons discussed above, more
comprehensive proposals could be adopted later or as part of
tax reform.
23The incentives for managements and bankers are to do
deals. Investment bankers have been generating lists of poten-
tial foreign targets that suggest the supply is ample for some
time. The Abbott Laboratories-Mylan ‘‘spinversion’’ suggests
that there are a very large number of potential targets within the
portfolio of foreign assets of existing U.S. multinationals. Com-
panies that already have expatriated are begetting additional
potential foreign targets. Each of the following inverted compa-
nies has engaged in spinoffs of companies at least one of which
has become a target: Tyco (split into three companies, including
Covidien PLC, a target of Medtronic Inc.), Covidien (a former
Tyco company has spun off Mallinckrodt Pharmaceuticals), and
Nabors Industries Ltd.
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.use for an alternative purpose. This is not a prin-
cipled reason to forgo a regulatory change if a
legislative change is unfeasible. For purposes of the
country’s fiscal health, the prevention of revenue
loss by a regulatory change is the same as if
implemented by statute.
The politics of a change are speculative. It is hard
to find many people outside Wall Street (andAbbott
Laboratories24) who think tax-motivated corporate
expatriations are a good thing, but that’s not the end
of the political calculus. Some politicians may be-
lieve this is a good issue with which to attack their
opponents for failing to adopt legislation. Others
may believe the administration is the loser if there is
a failure to act legislatively. Some may think politi-
cians from both parties are losers if there is a failure
to address the issue. The latter group should wel-
come Treasury action if Congress is incapable of
acting. Others may oppose regulatory action for fear
that President Obama would get credit. Some might
object to any action out of a preference for smaller
government (which rests on the heroic assumption
that expenditures will be reduced instead of debt
financed).
Irrespective of one’s political calculus, the policy
question is how much risk to U.S. welfare there is
from inaction in relation to cost from regulatory
action. If the risks outweigh the costs, action is
called for. Even acknowledging my revenue loss
aversion bias, regulatory action is called for in the
current circumstances.
3. Intercompany debt. Congress has addressed
debt-equity issues in recent years by limiting de-
ductions for interest, rather than classifying an
instrument as debt or equity. An advantage of
deduction limitation approaches is that they gener-
ally have a self-adjustment mechanism so that if
circumstances of the debt issuer change, greater or
lesser interest deductions are allowed. In contrast,
the U.S. practice generally has been to classify a
debt instrument on issuance and to retain that
classification. This is clunky and generally requires
a taxpayer to issue a new instrument in order to
change the classification. Classification as equity
not only eliminates the interest deduction, it also
causes cross-border payments qualifying as divi-
dends to be subject to withholding tax. The pro-
posal described above is limited to intercompany
indebtedness within an expanded affiliated group
so the taxpayer controls the amount of intercom-
pany debt and its consequences. The clunkiness
should be manageable.25
It is important to understand that even if the
United States were to lower its corporate tax rate and
adopt a territorial approach to exempting foreign
business income, there would be incentives to strip
the U.S. tax base — many of which would be iden-
tical to the incentives that exist under the current
regime. The structural changes in the proposals de-
scribed above would remain important after those
reforms as well as under current law. Moreover, this
brief discussion does not address the use of intan-
gibles and other devices to strip the U.S. tax base.
Proposals to address those abuses also are needed,
but they simply are not as important in affecting the
calculus of boardrooms that are considering corpo-
rate expatriations as intercompany debt and use of
offshore cash. A person involved in many deals es-
timatesthatwithoutthesetwoincentives,75percent
of the deals in process would not happen.
4. Combating avoidance of deferred U.S. taxation.
Companies considering expatriating have earned
income deferred from U.S. tax and now want to
avoid the tax. Congress has accorded Treasury
extraordinary authority to pursue complicated in-
ternational structures that sidestep U.S. tax rules,
including the rules under section 956 designed to
prevent use of deferred offshore earnings on a
pretax basis for the benefit of the U.S. company.
This authority has been used numerous times and
often aggressively. Congress over the years has
clearly indicated that it does not support tax-
motivated corporate expatriations. Inserting a new
foreign parent company should not be allowed as a
means of sidestepping rules that protect the de-
ferred U.S. tax on untaxed earnings.
Failing to act on this dimension will make future
tax reform even harder. If corporate expatriations
continue at a breakneck pace, there will be further
divisions in the business community regarding
those who have already avoided U.S. tax on their
CFC earnings and those that would have to pay the
toll charge that in all of the tax reform proposals is
a condition to shifting to a foreign exemption
24Myles White, ‘‘Ignoring the Facts on Corporate Inversions:
Don’t Believe Absurd Claims About Companies Abusing the
Tax Code or Being Unpatriotic,’’ The Wall Street Journal, op-ed
(July 17, 2014), available at http://online.wsj.com/articles/mil
es-d-white-ignoring-the-facts-on-corporate-inversions-14056383
76?KEYWORDS=Miles+White.
25Indeed, as David Rosenbloom has observed, treating a
group member as a creditor for tax purposes is a legal fiction
with little substance. H. David Rosenbloom, ‘‘Banes of an
Income Tax: Legal Fictions, Elections, Hypothetical Determina-
tions, Related Party Debt,’’ 26 Sydney Law Rev. 17 (2004) (‘‘There
seems to be only one serious problem with related party debt:
by most standards of economics, ‘substance,’ or common sense,
it is not debt. That is, related party debt is generally not
compensation for money lent by one person to another. Rather,
it is a transfer of funds from one incorporated pocket to another,
usually for tax-reduction purposes’’), available at http://www.
austlii.edu.au/au/journals/SydLRev/2004/2.html#Heading87.
COMMENTARY / VIEWPOINTS






























































































































.system. This is just one reason why Congress
should encourage the administration to take the
steps outlined above.
E. Conclusion
The proposed regulatory changes would materi-
ally reduce the incentive for a U.S. corporation to
expatriate for tax-motivated reasons by reducing
the cash and book tax benefits from expatriating.
These approaches would not prevent cross-border
combinations that are grounded on real business
objectives. They are supported by existing statutory
authority and integrate well with future tax reform.
Most important, they would stanch the rush to the
exit that is motivated by loopholes in our existing
tax rules and increase the ability to work toward
real international tax reform in the future. Without
action, there may be little corporate tax base to
reform.
The U.S. Treasury raises more revenue than any
other institution in the world. The tax system that
accomplishes this task requires constant attention
and protection — market forces cannot be relied
upon to fix problems. Without tax revenue, the
public goods the federal government provides can-
not be purchased, vital income transfers cannot be
made, and individuals suffer as a result. When
corporations do not pay their share, other taxpayers
have to make up the difference. Failing to address
tax-motivated corporate expatriations risks real
damage to the U.S. tax structure. The tools are
available; it is time to use them.
Petaluma and the Limits
Of Treasury’s Authority
By Andy S. Grewal
In United States v. Woods,1 the Supreme Court
seemingly resolved a jurisdictional issue and a
penalty issue regarding son-of-BOSS transactions
involving partnerships.2 On the jurisdictional issue,
the Court held that section 6226(f) allows a TEFRA
court to consider the application of the gross valu-
ation misstatement penalty to the inflation of out-
side basis in a sham partnership.3 The Court also
seemingly resolved the substantive penalty issue,
concluding that the gross valuation misstatement
penalty applies to the inflation of outside basis in a
sham partnership.
However, as I have previously explained, the
Court’s opinion does not definitively resolve either
issue.4 On the jurisdictional issue, the parties failed
to present a threshold regulatory question that
could preclude a TEFRA court from considering
any aspect of a case involving a sham partnership.
On the penalty issue, the Court itself doubted the
validity of reg. section 1.6662-5(g), which extends
the gross valuation misstatement penalty to zero
basis circumstances.5 But because the taxpayers in
1134 S. Ct. 557 (2013).
2For analysis of the bond and option sales strategy transac-
tion and its variants, see Karen C. Burke and Grayson M.P.
McCouch, ‘‘COBRA Strikes Back: Anatomy of a Tax Shelter,’’ 62
Tax Law. 59 (2008).
3‘‘TEFRA court’’ does not refer to any special type of federal
court, but rather to a court that is conducting a partnership-level
proceeding under the procedures established by the 1982 Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act, P.L. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324
(1982).
4See Andy S. Grewal, ‘‘The Missed Jurisdictional Argument
in United States v. Woods,’’ 33 BNA Tax Management Weekly Rpt.
100 (2014), available at http://tinyurl.com/WoodsJurisdiction.
5See reg. section 1.6662-5(g) (‘‘The value or adjusted basis
claimed on a return of any property with a correct value or
adjusted basis of zero is considered to be 400 percent or more of
the correct amount. There is a gross valuation misstatement
with respect to such property, therefore, and the applicable
penalty rate is 40 percent’’). For a sham partnership, each
partner’s outside basis is zero.
Andy S. Grewal is an associate professor at the
University of Iowa College of Law. He welcomes
comments at agrewal@iowa.uiowa.edu.
In this article, Grewal examines the fundamental
administrative law questions raised in Petaluma v.
Commissioner, pending before the D.C. Circuit.
Copyright 2014 Andy S. Grewal.
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